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PHONORECORDS AND FORFEITURE OF
COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT IN MUSIC
Mark A. Bailey
Abstract: A highly disputed issue surrounding the Copyright Act of 1909 is whether the
public distribution and sale of recordings of a musical work constitutes "publication."
Historically, unless the author followed the Act's formal requirements for obtaining statutory
protection, publication injected the musical work irrevocably into the public domain. In a
1995 decision, La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ.Top, the Ninth Circuit unwisely broke from the
tradition and common understanding in the music industry by holding that phonorecord
distribution is a publication of musical compositions. After examining the history and purpose
of the Copyright Act, as well as the legal precedents, this Comment argues that Congress did
not intend phonorecords to be capable of publication. Besides being unfair to composers of
original works, the court has created a split among the circuits that should be resolved.
United States copyright law recognizes the value of artistic creation
and is designed to foster creative output. Authors' rights in a given work
of art are defined by one of three exclusive realms: state common law,
federal statute, and the public domain. The uses to which authors put
their works determine which realm applies.
From its beginnings in 1790, the federal copyright scheme has
recognized both the existence and vitality of common-law copyright.'
Protection under the common law attached at the moment of a work's
creation and granted authors the right of first publication. This meant that
the work's creator held the exclusive right to decide whether and when to
share the work with the world by publishing it. Because the right of first
publication is perpetual, authors or their heirs could claim common-law
protection indefinitely, so long as the work remained unpublished.2
Under the Copyright Act of 19093 ("1909 Act"), the publication of a
work ended its common-law protection. Thus, if an author "published" a
1. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24
UCLA L. Rev. 1070, 1070-71 (1977). The express recognition of common-law protection prior to
publication is set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
2. The 1909 Act was repealed by the Copyright Act of 1976, making "tangible fixation," rather
than publication, the dividing line between common law and federal statutory protection. Act of Oct.
19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994)).
Under the 1976 Act, a musical composition loses common-law protection in exchange for statutory
rights at the point it is fixed in tangible form, which includes writing it down or recording its
performance. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The focus of this Comment is on the 1909 Act and the
traditional dichotomy between common law and statutory rights based on publication.
3. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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work prior to January 1, 1978,' federal protection became the only
available source of rights.' However, the 1909 Act provided federal
protection only if a copyright notice appeared on all publicly distributed
copies. The failure to follow this formality placed the work irrevocably
into the public domain, leaving anyone free to copy and use the work
without liability.7 Common law continued to protect unpublished works
until the Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") preempted such protection
by making "tangible fixation" the critical point at which the federal
interest attaches. 8 But the 1976 Act offers no protectior for any work
deemed to have been published under the 1909 Act which did not carry
the proper notice of copyright. 9
"Publication" determines whether common law or federal law is the
source of any available copyright protection under tle 1909 Act.'0
Although publication is a vastly important concept to authors when
determining their substantive rights, Congress declined to define the term
in the 1909 Act." Various judicial interpretations have resulted in
confusion and a lack of uniformity.'
2
A highly disputed issue surrounding the 1909 Act is whether the
public distribution and sale of phonograph records 3 constitutes a
4. This is the effective date of the 1976 Act, which brought all unpublished and fixed works into
its reach. Thus, many unpublished works lost common-law protection in exchange for the limited
monopoly ofa federal statutory copyright. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "when the statutory right begins tfe common-law right
ends." Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
7. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.2(2) (1977) ("If publication occurs by
distribution of copies or in some other manner, without the statutory notice oi with an inadequate
notice, the right to secure copyright is lost. In such cases, copyright cannot be secured by adding the
notice to copies distributed at a later date.").
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
9. See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 4.05[B], at 4-24 (1995);
see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1977).
10. Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1101.
11. Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938); Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F.
Supp. 1153, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The 1909 Act set the date of publication as the "earliest date
when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed." 17
U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). However, this language has not been interpreted as a
congressional attempt to define publication. See, e.g., Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368, 368
(D.C.N.Y. 1918).
12. See, e.g., Jones, 643 F. Supp. at 1158.
13. The issue is presented here using phonorecords for the purpose of discussion. Although most
of the relevant litigation has dealt exclusively with cases involving phonorecord distribution, the
Phonorecords and Copyright
publication that divests musical compositions of common-law
protection. 4 This is a question of statutory construction and legislative
intent, but its answer will necessarily involve practical and equitable
considerations. 5 The recording industry has evolved into a multi-billion
dollar business since the advent of phonorecord technology. 6 It has
generally acted on the assumption that the distribution of phonorecords is
not a publication under the 1909 Act. 7 Accordingly, many artists
released compositions without perceiving the need for registration or
affixing of a copyright notice to their records.' If the distribution or
public sale of recordings prior to January 1, 1978, is considered a
publication of the musical composition, composers must have
affirmatively sought federal protection upon such distribution in order to
prevent their works from falling into the public domain.
The dispute survives to this day, as evidenced by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top,19 which
departs from the established rule in the Second Circuit.2" Today, the
definition of "publication" under the 1909 Act continues to be vitally
important to composers who distributed phonorecords prior to its repeal.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit's rule that the distribution
of phonorecords divests the underlying musical compositions of
common-law protection unjustifiably deprives artists of their property
rights. The decision has created a dramatic split from the established rule
in the Second Circuit, the other major center of music copyright
litigation. The resulting destruction of national uniformity on this issue
legal analysis applies equally to cassette tapes, eight-tracks and any other medium capable of
capturing sounds for reproduction.
14. Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 185, 188 (1956). See also
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Publication and Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on
Goldstein v. California, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1022, 1038 (1975).
15. Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 947 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (Hand, Learned, J.) ("[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."), ajfd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
16. The sound recording market produced more than $10 billion in sales in 1993. The World
Almanac and Book of Facts, 1995, at 309 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds., 1994).
17. 1 Nimmer& Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B][1], at 4-24.
18. See Brown, supra note 14, at 1039 n.92.
19. 44 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.) (holding phonorecord distribution to constitute publication), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995).
20. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that phonorecord
distribution is not a publication).
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will undoubtedly encourage forum shopping and will undaly disrupt the
music industry. Part I explains the unique problem of copyright
protection for musical compositions. Part II discusses the leading cases
representing the divergent interpretations of the 1909 Act, and part III
discusses the weaknesses of the Ninth Circuit's approach. Finally, part
IV offers a practical solution that achieves an appropriate balance
between authors' rights and the public interest. The advocated solution
allows recording artists, who distributed phonorecords witlhout copyright
notice under the 1909 Act, to retain common-law rights in their music.
The proposal requires that courts hold a federal copyright to have vested
in such musical works when the 1976 Act took effect, and thus protects
the composer's creative efforts against infringement.
I. PHONORECORDS AND THE UNIQUE PROBLEM OF
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR MUSICAL COTMVPOSITIONS
A. Overview of Copyright Protection and Publication
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings. 21 Pursuant to this
authority, Congress established the first federal copyright law in 1790.22
The original subject matter of copyright was limited to maps, charts, and
books but was gradually expanded to include other works, such as
musical compositions23 and sound recordings,24 under a broad reading of
the constitutional term "writings."2 All of these works were protected by
common-law copyright prior to publication.
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
23. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1976) (repealed
effective 1978)).
24. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
25. Federal protection for works of art is not as all-encompassing as the Constitution allows. The
1909 Act, which has language that mirrors the constitutional term "writings," stales that "[t]he works
for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author." 17
U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). However, "writings" under the 1909 Act are more
limited in scope, regulating only certain specific categories of works. These categories, unlike the
more generous provisions of the 1976 Act, are exclusive. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (repealed effective
1978). See Brown, supra note 14, at 1028; see also 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
The 1976 Act dispenses with the term "writings" and offers protection to "works of authorship,"
clearly delineating the difference between the statutory subject matter and the full scope of
constitutional power.
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The 1909 Act made federal protection available via two routes.
Federal protection attached automatically when a work containing a
notice of copyright was published.26 Alternatively, the 1909 Act
permitted an author to obtain federal protection for an unpublished work
by depositing a copy with the U.S. Copyright Office.27 State common
law determined the author's rights in a work that was neither published
nor registered as an unpublished work.
The perpetual nature of common-law protection for unpublished
works stands in sharp contrast to the federal scheme. Copyright under the
1909 Act is a limited monopoly lasting for a twenty-eight-year term and
carrying the possibility of an additional twenty-eight-year renewal
term.28 The term begins to run on the date of either first publication or
registration, depending on which avenue of statutory protection was
sought. The limited duration of federal protection is the necessary result
of the power granted to Congress by the Constitution 9 and carries out the
public policy of allowing other artists to freely build upon earlier works
upon the expiration of copyright protection."
Applying the apparently simple concept of publication has led to
confusion in various contexts. Courts differentiate between "limited" and
"general" publication in to protect authors against the unintentional
relinquishment of their common-law rights." Publication is a question of
the author's intent,32 and to divest an author of common-law protection, a
work's public display must reach a substantial number of people.3 In the
case of literary works, the original focus and subject of copyright law,
the acts that constituted publication were clear: the general distribution
and sale of a printed book to the public. As the subject matter of
copyright law expanded, along with new media of expression,
26. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). The required notice consists of the word
"Copyright," the abbreviation "Copr.," or the symbol ©, along with the name of the copyright owner
and the year of first publication. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). Under the 1976 Act, duration of statutory
protection was changed to life of the author plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Nutt v. National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d
Cir. 1929).
32. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup.
Ct. 1950) (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240-41 (1918)), affd,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
33. See American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740,743 (2d Cir. 1956).
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determining the scope of the term "publication" became increasingly
difficult.3
4
B. Issues Regarding Divestive and Investive Publication
The Second Circuit, in an effort to protect authors' rights, has stated
that "[i]f all copyright in a work will be lost, the particular event might
not be a publication as to that work; if one copyright will simply be
exchanged for another, the same event can safely be labeled a publication
for the purpose of acquiring the statutory right."35 Whe, the inquiry is
whether certain acts have divested a work of common-law protection,
courts generally apply a high standard of publication in order to protect
the author. On the other hand, when the inquiry is whether a work has
been published so as to qualify for statutory protection, the standard is
relatively lower, because a finding of publication does not deprive the
author of protection.36
In an effort to allow artists to reap the rewards of their labor, courts
use the higher standard for "divestive" publication to protect them
against both piracy and unwitting forfeiture.37 In theory, a single event
may be sufficient to constitute investive publication, yet insufficient to
divest common-law rights.3" In practice, however, courts are reluctant to
find that an author unwittingly injected a work into the public domain by
merely failing to observe statutory formalities, even where publication
would have triggered federal protection.39 The policy of leaving the
34. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA
L. Rev. 1070, 1071-72 (1977).
35. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 672 F.2d 1095, t102 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
36. These different inquiries are referred to as "divestive" and "investive" publication. The
concepts refer respectively to the loss of common-law copyright and the securing of statutory
protection through the act of publication. See id. at 1101-02; Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F.
Supp. 1153, 1159 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Copyright Office has spoken on tie varying standards
of publication, stating that:
[I]n order to accord statutory copyright, the issue of a few copies with the notice of copyright
has been held, in some instances, to constitute publication; conversely, in order to preserve
common law rights, in other cases, the distribution of a considerable number of copies without
the copyright notice has been considered "limited" publication and, co isequently, not a
forfeiture of the common law rights.
William Strauss, Attomey-Advisor to the Copyright Office, General Revisio, of Copyright Law:
Study No. 7, at 50 (1958).
37. Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1102.
38. 1d. at 1104. See also Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941,945 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1104.
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author with some form of copyright is especially appropriate in situations
where the author has relied on an industry understanding that
phonorecord distribution will not forfeit common-law rights. The result
that would otherwise follow is antithetical to the copyright law's purpose
of promoting artistic creation.
The common law's perpetual monopoly secures rights analogous to
tangible forms of personal property,40 the loss of which is of substantial
economic consequence.4 Because so many artists distributed their
records without perceiving any need to include notice of copyright under
the 1909 Act, defining distribution as a publication will divest many
composers of their expected property rights. Under the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation, entire catalogs of music released before January 1, 1978,
will be held to have been unwittingly injected into the public domain.
This will require music publishers to trace the history of each
composition they own to determine whether copyright notice appeared
on all phonorecords. Contracts for musical rights may be deemed
voidable due to mistake of fact or lack of consideration if the assignor is
held to have lost all rights prior to contracting. In short, the economic
and practical impact on copyright owners and the courts will be
immense.
C. The Phonorecord Captures a Performance Rather Than Copying a
Musical Composition
When Congress first extended the Copyright Act to protect musical
compositions,42 sheet music was the only way such works were copied
and registered.43 Technology had not advanced to the point where
mechanical reproduction of music was possible. Sheet music was
universally recognized as a copy of the musical work, and thus its public
distribution and sale constituted divestive publication.'
The twentieth century has seen a dramatic shift in the principal
method by which musicians introduce their works to the public for
enjoyment. Numerous methods of capturing performances in fixed form
have made listening to music possible at the flip of a switch, rendering
40. Richard R. Bowker, Copyright: Its History and Its Law 42 (1912).
41. See, e.g., Carew v. Melrose Music, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 971,972 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
42. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). "Sheet music" is the written embodiment
of a composition in musical notation.
44. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8 (1908).
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sheet music and live performances unnecessary. Even today, however,
music notation is the only way to actually copy a musical composition. A
phonorecord merely captures a particular performance by musicians,
whose interpretation and technique cause the performance to exist
independently from the composition.
The United States Supreme Court in Ferris v. Frohman45 established
the rule that an author of a play could exploit the work forever on the
stage, retaining common-law protection as long as the work was not
published in print.46 Implicit in this holding is the recognition that a
performance is not a "copy" of a work under the plain meaning of the
term. As such, a performance is not a publication and cannot divest the
author of his common law rights. 7 The number of people who see or
hear the work performed is irrelevant.4" Thus, exploitation of an author's
work for profit is not the touchstone for publication under the 1909 Act.
Authors are free to profit from the fruits of their labor without
necessarily bringing their works within the ambit of federal concern.
The rule that public performances do not affect common-law rights
has been applied to presentations of an unpublished dramatic work49 and
exhibitions of motion pictures,"a suggesting that the ephemeral nature of
live performance is not the determinative factor in the publication
inquiry. The rule extends equally to the musical composition.5' Since the
Supreme Court's opinion in Fen-is, however, emerging technologies
have spawned a number of methods to capture music for reproduction,
making the treatment of musical compositions under the 1909 Act
conceptually unique.
Much of the difficulty in defining "publication," as applied to musical
compositions, stems from the fact that the Copyright Act was historically
45. 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
46. Id. at 435.
47. E.g., Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1104 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Nutt v. National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d
236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929).
48. Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1937) (explaining that "many
thousands of people" saw a motion picture exhibited), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938). See also
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup. Ct.
1950) (stating that the performance of opera is not a "publication," even though it was also broadcast
over a radio network), affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
49. Ferris, 223 U.S. at 435.
50. Patterson, 93 F.2d at 491.
51. McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 F. 364 (D.C.N.Y. 1919).
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directed toward written works. 2 The Universal Copyright Convention
has defined "publication" as "the reproduction in tangible form and the
general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can
be read or otherwise visually perceived."53 Implicit in this reasoning is
the assumption that phonorecord distribution is not a publication of the
works they contain. When captured on a phonorecord, a musical
composition can only be audibly perceived through the aid of a record
player. Therefore, the general distribution of phonorecords is not a
publication.
D. White-Smith: The Source of the Rule That Phonorecords Are Not
Copies
Traditionally, phonorecords have not been treated as copies under
federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court sowed the seeds of this statutory
interpretation in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 4 This
case involved an action for copyright infringement against the Apollo
Company for manufacturing and selling perforated piano rolls of the
plaintiff's songs without authorization.55 At the beginning of the century,
the manufacture of piano rolls dramatically increased, threatening
substantial property interests in songs and making an authoritative
interpretation of the Copyright Act necessary.5 6 White-Smith provided the
opportunity. The validity of the plaintiffs copyright was not questioned
because the songs had been published as sheet music with notice of
copyright." The only issue was whether the plaintiff had a right to
prohibit the defendant's acts. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
relying on the uniform holdings58 of other courts that had rejected the
notion that the Copyright Act was meant to protect copyright owners
against the mechanical reproduction of their songs by others. 9 The U.S.
52. See Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records,
103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469 (1955).
53. U.C.C. art. VI (Paris text) (1971) (emphasis added). Although this definition is not binding on
American courts, the delegation of the United States urged the Convention to adopt the "visually
perceived" limitation because it believed this view represented U.S. law. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 9, § 4.05[B][3], at 4-30 n.42.
54. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. Id. at 17.
59. E.g., Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) ("I cannot convince
myself that these perforated sheets of paper are copies of sheet music, within the meaning of the
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Supreme Court affirmed,6" holding that the piano roll was not a copy of
the musical composition under the terms of the statute.6 Thus, the
defendant's manufacturing of piano rolls did not infringe on the
plaintiff's exclusive right to copy his work.62
Courts have struggled with phonorecord distribution under the 1909
Act due to the lack of an express legislative definition of "publication."
Before the introduction of sound reproduction devices, publication of
musical works was a simple concept: the distribution and sale of sheet
music published the work-public performances did not.63 As new
technologies for capturing musical works in fixed form developed,
however, the definition of "publication" and the scope cf congressional
intent to regulate musical compositions became difficult to ascertain.'
In dicta, the Court in White-Smith noted that the same result would
apply with equal force to "the record of a graphophone. ' 6S Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit later applied the White-Smith rule to phonorecords in
Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co.6 The plaintiff in Corcoran
unsuccessfully argued that by setting his copyrighted poem to music and
selling phonorecords to the public, the defendant had infringed on his
exclusive statutory right to copy and vend his protected work.67 The
Ninth Circuit expressed misgivings about leaving the copyright owner
copyright law. They are not made to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form part of a
machine."), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 643 (1892); Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-65
(1901). The Stern court stated:
We cannot regard the reproduction, through the agency of the phonograph. of the sounds of
musical instruments playing [music] as the copy or publication of the same within the meaning
of the act. The ordinary signification of the words "copying", "publishing", etc., can not be
stretched to include [such reproduction devices].
60. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
61. The relevant statute at the time of the White-Smith decision was 17 U.S.C. § 4952 (1908)
(repealed 1909). See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 9.
62. Id. at 17. The Court stated:
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune copies it;
but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the combination of musical sounds is
reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the author which is heard.
63. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
64. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
65. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
66. 121 F.2d 572, 573 (9th Cir.) ("If the question were one of first impression we might be
inclined to agree [that a reproduction of music for acoustical enjoyment is a 'copy']; but [this]
argument appears to be foreclosed in the decision in White-Smith."), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687
(1941).
67. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1976) (repealed effective 1978) grants the exclusive right to "print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work."
Phonorecords and Copyright
with no rights against the unauthorized production and sale of
phonorecords, but acknowledged that it was bound by congressional
intent and held that phonorecords did not infringe any statutory right.68
The court reasoned that although the U.S. Supreme Court in White-Smith
had invited Congress to include the control of phonorecords within the
statutory right to copy a work, the 1909 amendments left intact the rule
that piano rolls and phonorecords were not copies.69
II. PHONORECORDS AND PUBLICATION: DISAGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
A. The Second Circuit's Rule: Phonorecord Distribution Is Not a
Publication of Musical Compositions
In Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp.,7" the Second
Circuit decided a copyright infringement claim by a plaintiff who had
sold recordings of her songs, without notice, before she sought statutory
copyright. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's rejection of the
defendant's prior publication defense, holding that the plaintiff's rights
were not lost to the public domain.7' Therefore, her subsequent
registration for statutory copyright was valid.
The Rosette court properly considered the view of the copyright bar
and the music industry that the distribution of phonorecords did not
constitute a publication of songs under the 1909 Act. The trial court
opinion recognized that a number of artists had relied upon this
interpretation. 72 The court then went on to examine the case authorities
cited by the defendant for its proposition that the plaintiff had published
her songs.
The Rosette trial court first examined Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Miracle Record Co.,' which involved a claim for infringement of the
68. Corcoran, 121 F.2d at 574.
69. Id. at 573 (citing White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18). Note that the 1909 Act's mechanical royalty
provision, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1976) (repealed effective 1978), offered the plaintiff no remedy because
it applied by its terms only to musical compositions and not to poems. Section l(e) is discussed infra
at notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
70 546 F.2d461 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 463.
72. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
73. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
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plaintiff's bass line.74 The Shapiro court stated in dicta that the
production and sale of a phonograph record is as much a publication as
distribution of sheet music. 7' However, the ultimate judgment for the
defendant rested on the finding that the plaintiffs bass line was too
simple to qualify for copyright protection. 7' Likewise, in McIntyre v.
Double-A Music Corp.,77 the court's view that the distribution of
phonorecords constituted publication was stated in dicta because the
work at issue lacked sufficient originality to qualify for copyright.78
Finally, in Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc.,79 the court held that
publication had resulted from the foreign distribution of recordings"0 and
merely stated in passing that the manufacture and sale of phonograph
records in the United States would constitute publication of a
composition.8
None of these decisions had attempted to address the conflict with the
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo
Co.82 But the rule that phonorecords are not copies proved determinative
to the trial court in Rosette." The court held that the 109 Act had left
the U.S. Supreme Court's rule intact, and because phonorecords were not
copies, they were not capable of publication.' Moreover, the court stated
that Congress had rejected the notion that the permanency of a recording
makes it more than a mere performance."
Of all the decisions that have addressed the issue, Rosette provides the
only fully reasoned analysis and synthesis of the statute, prior case law,
and historical industry practice. The Second Circuit's opinion in Rosette
74. Id. A "bass line" is the series of low-register notes that underlie a musical composition.
75. Id. at 475.
76. Id. at 474.
77. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
78. "The foregoing portion of this opinion assumes that plaintiff's arrangement was an original
composition and therefore could have been the subject of copyright. However, I find plaintiff's
composition was insufficient to qualify for either a common-law or a statutory copyright." Id. at 683
(emphasis added).
79. 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
80. Id. at 65. Distribution of recordings in foreign countries is treated differ mtly than distribution
in the United States under the Copyright Act. Id. at 75.
81. Id. at 69. In any event, the statement in Mills Music is no longer good law, being effectively
overruled in Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
82. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 229 U.S. 1 (1908).
83. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1191-92.
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was for years the most authoritative statement on the issue of publication
through distribution and sale of phonorecords.86 Until the Ninth Circuit
departed from the Second Circuit's rule, and although some courts had
indicated that they might arrive at a different result, no case had
explicitly held that public distribution of records divested the author of
common-law protection in the composition under the terms of the 1909
Act.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Rule: Phonorecord Distribution Is a
Publication
In La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top,87 the plaintiff, as the assignee of
blues artist John Lee Hooker's rights, sued the popular Texas blues-rock
band, ZZ Top, claiming that their signature song, La Grange, infringed
on Hooker's composition Boogie Chillen.8" Hooker had followed
industry practice and released phonorecords of his song in 1948 without
seeking statutory protection. 9 He released subsequent derivative
recordings in 1959 and 1970.9" La Cienega later filed for federal
copyright by registering each version as an unpublished work in 1967,
1970, and 1992, relying on the common understanding that the sale of
Hooker's albums had not injected Boogie Chillen into the public
domain.9'
On this matter of first impression, however, the Ninth Circuit held that
Hooker had published each version on the release dates of the albums.9'
The merits of the infringement claim were thus never reached. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint regarding the 1948 and
1959 versions, because their twenty-eight-year terms would have expired
even if statutory copyright had been secured. The case was remanded,
however, to determine whether the 1970 version had been released with
copyright notice, because the resulting statutory copyright term, if any,
would not have expired.93 In concluding that Hooker had unwittingly
86. 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B], at 4-28 n.29.
87. 44 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995).
88. Id. at 814.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 815.
92. Id. at 815-16.
93. Id. at 816. See also 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (repealed effective 1978), which requires that upon
publication, "notice of copyright... shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for
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published his song, the Ninth Circuit created a split with the Second
Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit in ZZ Top rejected the Second Circuit's analysis for
two reasons. First, it stated that Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing
Corp.94 was the minority rule and that no other circuit had followed it.95
This misleading label was based on a passage in Nimmer on Copyright96
but lacks support in case law. At the time, Rosette was the only
appellate-level authority to address the effect of phonorecord distribution
under the 1909 Act.97 Professor Nimmer's "majority view" rests on the
dicta of the three district court cases cited in Rosette,9' along with four
other trial court decisions.99 Of these seven decisions, only one,
International Tape Manufacturers Ass'n v. Gerstein,1°° expressly held
that the distribution of phonorecords is publication sufficient to divest a
work of common-law protection-a decision later vacated by the Fifth
Circuit.'0  In contrast, five decisions have agreed with Rosette that the
public sale of phonorecords is not publication under the 1909 Act.0
Second, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the Rosette rule reduced the
incentive to submit immediately to the limitations of the 1909 Act.03
Rosette required compositions to be registered before authors could
sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor" in order to secure statutory
protection.
94. 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
95. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815.
96. Professor Nimmer states: "IT]he relatively few courts which considered the question were
almost unanimous in determining that public sale or other distribution of phonorecords does
constitute a publication and hence a divestment of common law rights in the works recorded." I
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B] at 4-26.
97. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815.
98. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
99. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B at 4-26 n.18 (citing International Tape
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated, 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974));
Biltmore Music Corp. v. Kittinger, 29 Copyright Off. Bull. 32 (S.D. Cal. 1954), modified, 238 F.2d
373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1949); Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
100. 344 F. Supp. at 57.
101. 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974).
102. See Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2. Cir. 1955); Tempo
Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jones v. Virgin Records,
Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allen Fin.
Advertising, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 1003 (W.D. Mich. 1979); Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp.
922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1965).
103. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 331
(1995).
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sue.'04 The Ninth Circuit feared that, at least until they desired to bring an
action for infringement, authors would indefinitely exploit their songs
through public sales of records. 5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit argued that
artists could delay compliance with the Copyright Act's requirements
and receive "longer" copyright protection. 6
III. PHONORECORD DISTRIBUTION IS NOT "PUBLICATION"
UNDER THE 1909 ACT
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the distribution and sale of
phonorecords causes a forfeiture of common-law rights in musical
compositions under the 1909 Act. In light of clear authoritative
interpretations of the 1909 Act by the Copyright Office0 7 and the
common understanding of the recording industry, La Cienega Music Co.
v. ZZ Top' disregards authors' reasonable expectations to intellectual
property rights. The court undermined copyright law's fundamental
policy of securing to authors the rewards of their creative efforts, and
offered no equal countervailing policy. The ZZ Top holding was further
unwarranted because of its glaring departure from the law in the Second
Circuit, thereby creating a need for U.S. Supreme Court resolution to
avoid the clear incentive for forum shopping.
A. Congressional Intent
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in 1908,"09 holding that a piano roll
is not a copy of a musical composition, explicitly encouraged Congress
to extend the Copyright Act if it wished to grant protection against the
manufacture of such devices by others."0 A year later, Congress
104. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
105. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815.
106. Id.
107. The U.S. Copyright Office was authorized by statute to make rules and regulations for the
registration of copyright claims. 17 U.S.C. § 207 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
108. 44 F.3d 813.
109. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
I 10. After holding that a piano roll is not a copy within the meaning of the Copyright Act, Justice
Day commented:
It may be true that the use of these perforated rolls, in the absence of statutory protection,
enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of musical compositions for which they pay
no value. But such considerations properly address themselves to the legislative, and not the
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responded and substantially revised the Copyright Act."' The 1909 Act
gave music copyright owners the right to compensation fbr unauthorized
mechanical reproductions of their works." 2 However, this newly created
right was limited. Congress did not include phonorecords and piano rolls
within the definition of "copy" under section 1(a)," 3 which would have
prohibited the mechanical reproduction of copyrighted works without the
copyright owner's consent. Instead, Congress created a compulsory
license, which allows phonorecord producers to use copyrighted
compositions without liability, provided they pay a royalty to the
copyright owner."4
The compulsory license was new and unique to U.S. copyright law,
fostering extensive debate over the propriety of recognizing mechanical
reproduction rights in musical compositions." 5 Not only did some
legislators oppose this extension of copyright protection but even those
in favor of the proposed provisions were divided into two groups. Some
argued for granting exclusive recording rights to the copyright owner,
while others favored granting only the limited right to collect royalties
for the unauthorized recording and sale of protected works." 6
The remedy provided by the 1909 Act affirmed Congress's choice not
to treat such mechanical reproductions as copyright infringement. In
creating this new remedy based on royalties, rather than infringement,
Congress explicitly preserved the conceptual difference between copies
and phonorecords under the White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co. "' analysis.' t8 Section 1(e) provided for "payment to the copyright
judicial, branch of Government. As the act of Congress now stands we believe it does not
include these records as copies or publications of the copyrighted music invo ved in these cases.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
111. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (r.epealed by Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541).
112. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
113. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1976) (repealed effective 1978) provides: "Any person entitled thereto,
upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right... [to copy.., the
copyrighted work."
114. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
115. See Harry G. Henn, General Revision of the Copyright Law: Study No. 1 (1957) (describing
in detail the congressional bills introduced on the subject) [hereinafter Geaeral Revision]. The
Report of the House Committee on Patents accompanying the successful bill, H.R. 28192, states that
§ I(e) "has been the subject of more discussion and has taken more of the time of the committe [sic]
than any other provision in the bill." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. ,(1909).
116. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
117. 209 U.S. I (1908).
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proprietor of a royalty of [two] cents on each such part manufactured."" 9
Congress did not define phonorecords as a "copy" of the musical
composition anywhere in the revised Act.'20
The treatment of phonorecords and piano rolls in section 1(e) was
largely a compromise to avoid anti-trust issues. Anticipating a
congressional grant of the exclusive right to produce such devices, the
Aeolian Company contracted for these rights with more than eighty of
the leading music-publishing companies in the country.' If Congress
had granted copyright owners the exclusive right to make mechanical
reproductions, Aeolian would have acquired a substantial monopoly. The
mechanical royalty provisions of the 1909 Act clearly evince
congressional intent that phonorecords remain outside the scope of the
statutory term "copy." Section 1(e) applies only to musical compositions
and is independent of the exclusive right to copy in section l(a), which
prohibits unauthorized sheet music without qualification. The owner of a
copyright in a musical work has no cause of action against the
phonorecord manufacturer as long as the statutory royalties are paid.
Later enactments, although not controlling, illustrate Congress's
hands-off approach to musical compositions under the 1909 Act. There is
no reason why Congress could not have expressly defined phonorecords
as copies of the underlying musical composition. The 1971 amendments
to the 1909 Act illustrate the simplicity of the task.' Congress added
sound recordings to the list of copyrightable subject matter,'23 and
118. While the copyright law since 1909 has protected . . . musical compositions against
recording and mechanical reproduction, it has not changed the ruling in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. that recordings were not "copies" of the musical composition or "writings" of an
author within the scope of the existing copyright statute.
Harry G. Henn, The Compulsory License Provisions of the United States Copyright Law, in General
Revision, supra note 115, at 23.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1976) (repealed effective 1978) (emphasis added). The House Report on
the 1909 Act states: "It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright to the
mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the
control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices."
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
120. Note that Congress did exactly this with respect to sound recordings in the 1971 amendment.
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
121. General Revision, supra note 115, at vi n.44.
122. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
l(f), 5(n), 19,20,26, 101(e) (1976) (repealed effective 1978)). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1994).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (1976) (repealed effective 1978). Sound recordings are works that result
from the fixation of a series of sounds. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed effective 1978). They differ
from musical compositions in that it is the actual sounds recorded that are protected, under the class
of sound recordings, against unauthorized sampling or dubbing.
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provided that reproductions of the actual sounds are copies of this type of
protected work. 24
It is true that when Congress rewrote the Copyright Act: in 1976,25 the
copyright owner was expressly given exclusive rights over "copies or
phonorecords,"' 12 6 but this language shows that the two terms are not
synonymous. Furthermore, the 1976 Act specifically prov:tdes that copies
are "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed."'27 Under the 1976 Act, publication poses no threat to common-
law rights, because a work must necessarily be fixed in some form, and
thus already protected, before it can be published. Nevertheless,
publication is expressly defined for the first time, as "the distribution of
copies or phonorecords of a work to the public."''" Courts have
universally accepted that the distribution of copies publishes a work
under the 1909 Act,'29 but the inclusion of phonorecords in the 1976 Act
does not reflect prior congressional intent. 30 Interpretation of the 1909
Act should not be influenced by the broader scope of the term
"publication" in the 1976 Act, but rather should depenc solely on the
language, structure, and intent of the 1909 Act itself.
B. Agency Interpretation
ZZ Top's holding that a phonorecord is a copy of the musical
composition that publishes the work and divests the author of common-
law rights upon distribution overlooks the Copy-ight Office's
interpretation of the 1909 Act. "Phonorecord" and "copy" are used
separately throughout the 1976 Act and Copyright Offic.e regulations.
For example, a recent regulation on musical scores' 3' provides that a
musical composition can be published in "copies only, or in both copies
and phonorecords."' 32  Another regulation provides that musical
compositions, as a class of works protected by the 190 9 Act, include
124. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
125. See supra note 2.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
129. E.g., Burke v. National Broadcasting Co.. 598 F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
869 (1979).
130. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.04, at 4-17 to 4-18.
131. The "score" is another term for sheet music.
132. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (1995). See also supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text..
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"published or unpublished musical compositions in the form of visible
notation."'33
The Copyright Office's administrative staff manual'34 clarifies its
interpretations of the 1909 Copyright Act and also merits
consideration.'35 The manual outlines the effect of publicly disclosing
works by means other than distribution of copies.'36 It states that "the act
of distributing phonorecords does not constitute such publication as will
invest a statutory copyright, except for registration as a sound
recording."'37 Because the act of distribution is insufficient to secure
federal copyright, it should not at the same time remove protection under
the common law, as the test for divestive publication is more rigorous.'38
The Copyright Office's interpretation thus implies that the distribution of
phonorecords will not divest the author of comnon-law rights in
compositions. Otherwise, phonorecord distribution would unavoidably
force an unpublished work into the public domain.
C. A Copy Is a Copy Is a Copy...
Although the scope of publication depends on the context involved, 39
the term "copy" should have a consistent definition. The term "copy" is
relevant under the 1909 Act in three contexts: infringement, registration,
and publication of recorded musical compositions. As for the
infringement standard, the White-Smith doctrine holds that mechanical
reproductions are not considered copies of music. 4 The 1909 Act,
providing the compulsory license provisions of 17 U.S.C. § l(e),
accepted this definition.
As for registration of unpublished musical compositions, the 1909 Act
allowed the deposit of copies with the Copyright Office,' 4' but applicable
regulations provided that a "phonograph record ... is not considered a
133. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1977).
134. Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (As of July 1. 1973) (1973) [hereinafter
Compendium). See also 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(b)(3) (1977).
135. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
136. Compendium, supra note 134, ch. 3.1.3.
137. Id., ch. 3.l.3(IV)(a), at 3-10.
138. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
139. See Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1975); American Visuals
Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1956) (discussing the "one-word-one-meaning only
fallacy").
140. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
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'copy' of the compositions recorded on it, and is not acceptable for
copyright registration." '42 Sheet music was the only medium accepted
until the 1976 Act explicitly allowed phonorecords 43
Consistent with these statutory definitions of "copy" in the context of
infringement and registration, a phonorecord should not be considered a
copy of the musical composition that would cause a work to be
published. Sound policy supports adherence to the White-Smith rule in
the context of publication. Otherwise, it would be impossible for the
author who distributes recordings of his music to secure federal
protection. This is because under section 10 of the 1909 Act copyright
may be secured by publication only if notice of copyright is "affixed to
each copy thereof published."'" If a phonorecord is considered a copy of
the musical work, this provision would conflict with the rule that the
failure to affix copyright notice to a phonorecord has no effect on
author's rights. 14s Thus, phonorecords are not copies under section 10.
Holding them to be copies in the context of publication i:3 contradictory
and should be avoided unless the Constitution or the 1909 Act itself
mandates the different definition.
Courts should remain sensitive to the equities involved in stripping
authors of copyright protection. Because a defendant's production of a
phonorecord does not copy a protected work, a phonorecord should not
be a copy that triggers publication merely because the copyright owner
manufactures it.'46 This reasoning makes sense, as nothing in the 1909
Act indicates the contrary. However, it raises concerns regarding the
Supremacy Clause 47 and the states' common-law power to protect
recorded compositions without the time limitations imposed on statutory
copyright owners."'
142. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1977). See, e.g., Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922, 926
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 343 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1965).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1994).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed effective 1978) (emphasis added).
145. E.g., Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Nom
Music, 227 F. Supp. at 926.
146. See, e.g., Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
affd, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the court stated:
From this result it was logical to conclude that if the infringing music roll was not a copy of the
composition so as to cast its maker in liability, the creation of a music roll by the author himself
would not make it a "copy" of his work and hence not a publication of it.
147. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.2.
148. The constitutional concern stems from the conclusion by the Rosette cou't that "it is unlikely
that Congress intended that common-law rights should exceed those of statutory copyright owners"
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D. Holding Phonorecords Incapable of Publication Does Not Threaten
Statutory Objectives
Section 26 of the 1909 Act states that the "date of publication [is the]
earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on
sale, sold, or publicly distributed."'' 49 Nevertheless, courts widely
accepted that this was not an attempt to define "publication."' 50 Rather,
section 26 merely fixes the date from which the statutory term begins to
run.'5 ' Therefore, preemption principles do not bar the exclusion of
phonorecord distribution from the definition of publication.1
5 2
The Ninth Circuit in ZZ Top ignored the language of the 1909 Act and
agency regulations, asserting what it believed to be policy justifications
for its holding that phonorecord distribution is publication of musical
compositions. The court hoped to discourage artists from abusing the
copyright laws by delaying compliance with the federal act.153 However,
the common law does not threaten adherence to the 1909 Act by
providing a disincentive for the recording artist to seek federal
protection. The non-publishing author retains the exclusive right to print,
publish, copy, or vend the work. 54 Furthermore, musical compositions
protected by common law could not be arranged, adapted, or performed
publicly without the author's consent. 55 The Ninth Circuit argued that if
the distribution and sale of phonograph records had no effect on these
rights, then composers would avoid seeking the limited monopoly of the
federal statute.'56 Although the Second Circuit requires registration under
the 1909 Act to sue for infringement,'57 the Ninth Circuit feared the
inequitable result that the author would wait years before registering, and
of compositions distributed on phonorecords. 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B] at 4-28
n.28 (quoting Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
150. See, e.g., Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204,206 (9th Cir. 1938).
151. Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1937) (citing Cardinal Film
Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
152. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955); Tempo
Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
153. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331
(1995).
154. Bowker, supra note 40, at 45.
155. Id.
156. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815.
157. Rosette v. Rainbo Records Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
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then still receive the full fifty-six-year protection provided by the 1909
Act. 5
8
This undesirable result is avoidable without going to the extreme of
holding that public sale of records without notice irrevocably injects
musical compositions into the public domain. By upsetting proprietary
interests in numerous compositions distributed in phonorecords pursuant
to industry practice,' 59 the Ninth Circuit's holding in ZZ Top is entirely
unjustified. As the Rosette court noted, precedent should be reliable
rather than a trap for the unwary, particularly in a technical field where
the lawyers, assumed to be learned, guide the hand of the untutored
artist."6
The crux of the position that the distribution of phonorecords divests
common-law rights in the musical work is the fear that the perpetual
monopoly of an exploited work will provide a disincentive to seek
federal copyright, burdening the progress of the axts. However,
exploitation for profit does not automatically bring a work into the
sphere of federal concern.'6 ' Otherwise, for example, public performance
would be publication. 162 This is simply not the case. 163 Although it may,
at first glance, seem contrary to common sense to differentiate between
the distribution of phonorecords and of sheet music,'"4 the language of
the 1909 Act, as well as federal policy, supports this result. By
withholding copyright protection from phonorecords,'65 Congress has
deemed them to be of federal interest under the 1909 Act only to the
extent provided in the mechanical royalty provisions of 17 U.S.C. § l(e).
Even if congressional intent was not clear, musical compositions are
valuable property rights that should not be divested based on an
ambiguous understanding of "publication."
158. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815. Fifty-six years is the sum of the initial 28-year term plus the renewal
period.
159. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1188; 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.0 5[B], at 4-28 n.30.
160. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1188.
161. The position of the Copyright Office is that distributing phonorecords does not publish the
recorded work. Compendium, supra note 134, ch. 3.1.3 (IV)(a), at 3-10.
162. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 84 (1967).
163. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (holding that public performance is not a
publication).
164. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
165. 37 C.F.R § 202.8(b) (1977); Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 660
(2d Cir. 1955).
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The Copyright Act has two major purposes: to provide an incentive to
create original works of art and to reward the owner's labors.'66 As a
general rule, protecting author's rights is a secondary consideration, or a
means to an end.'67 Intellectual property law serves the larger purpose of
creating an incentive to produce works of art for the benefit of the
public, 6 ' but in situations such as that presented in ZZ Top, where the
phonorecords in question were sold to the public before the effective date
of the new Copyright Act, the concern over the promotion of the arts is
not present. John Lee Hooker already has shared his work with the world
and securing to the author the fruits of his labor should be of singular
importance in construing the 1909 Act.
The Ninth Circuit's fear that Rosette encourages composers to "abuse"
copyright laws by exploiting their works without the exchange for the
limited statutory monopoly is at best speculative. Recording artists
usually enjoy the greatest commercial success when their songs are first
released. If the artist declines to secure statutory protection at the outset,
then statutory mechanical royalties are unavailable during the most
lucrative period for most popular songs. Congress, however, left the
choice up to the artist by providing the option of reliance on common-
law protection. The fact that statutory protection is available does not
mean that it is the exclusive source of rights. This is evident from the fact
that 17 U.S.C § 12 allowed artists to register unpublished works for
statutory protection. 69 By declining to register the work as an
unpublished work or to distribute sheet music, the author did no violence
to any policy of the 1909 Act.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Second Circuit's rule that the distribution of phonorecords does
not publish songs presents a partial solution to the problem of copyright
protection. The rule avoids the potential inequities involved in removing
rights that common industry practice has long recognized. The rule is a
166. E.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd,
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
167. Id. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.").
168. The House committee that recommended the 1909 Act said that copyright was "[n]ot
primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public." H.R. Rep. No.
2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
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justifiable interpretation of the ambiguous language of the 1909 Act. The
interpretation fulfills the statutory objective of eventual public access to
works, and it protects the rights of the unwary recording artist. Although
Rosette held that the artist had to register the musical work only if the
author wanted to collect mechanical royalties or sue for infiingement of a
recorded song, 7' the court did not specify how long statutory protection
would last. The Ninth Circuit apparently assumed that upon the eventual
registration of the work, the author would necessarily be entitled to the
full fifty-six years of statutory protection.' 7' This is a result that is
mandated neither by the Rosette analysis nor by the language of the 1909
Act.
The dissent in La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top 72 offers the second
half of the solution. According to the dissent, the unpublished work
could be protected only as long as would have been possible had the
author registered the work when he or she first released phonorecords'7
Thus, the twenty-eight-year initial term would begin to run upon the date
of distribution of phonorecords, even if one chose to rely on common-
law rights rather than seeking federal statutory protection."74 This result
synthesizes the holding in White-Smith175 that mechanical reproductions
are not "copies" of musical works with the purpose of the 1909 Act to.
protect authors from infringers and pirates.
Section 2 prohibits any construction of the 1909 Act that would annul
or limit common-law protection.7 7 Although this solution might seem to
violate the statute by "limiting" common-law rights in unpublished
works,'77 it is necessary to protect authors who relied on the continuing
validity of common-law protection. This solution saves a great number
of musical compositions from falling into the public domain'78 and
effectuates the copyright law's policy of rewarding artistic creation.
170. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff d, 546
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976). This is assuming that the song had not been publi,,hed as sheet music,
which would, in and of itself, have divested common-law protection.
171. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
172. 44 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995).
173. 44 F.3d at 817 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
175. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
177. 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 4.05[B], at 4-28.
178. Id. § 4.05[B], at 4-28 n.30.
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Although this solution is not explicitly mandated by the statute,'79 it
protects those whom copyright law is meant to protect. The running of
the statutory term upon phonorecord distribution is a concession to the
public interest of free access to artistic works after a period of
protection. 80 In contrast, the court in ZZ Top created a no-win situation
for the composer by holding that distribution of records without notice
divested the author of common-law rights.18' Because a phonorecord is
not a copy, attaching notice thereto does not satisfy the 1909 Act's
requirement that notice be affixed to "each copy" published.'82 With the
notice mechanism unavailable for phonorecords, the only way a
composer could safely distribute recordings of his music to the public
would be to first publish or register sheet music with notice-a
requirement that is inconsistent with music industry practice.'83 Such a
requirement would penalize musicians who are not trained in musical
notation or cannot afford a transcriber. Copyright law's purpose of
protecting authors cannot be harmonized with the rule proposed in ZZ
Top, which would divest common-law rights upon phonorecord
distribution. This is especially true because the same act is insufficient to
invest the musical work with statutory protection.'84
Publication, which causes a forfeiture of common-law protection, is
generally understood to be public distribution of a work in the form of
copies. The phonorecord, however, can be distinguished from a copy in
many contexts. Under the 1909 Act, an author secures copyright by
publishing copies of a work only if notice is "affixed to each copy
thereof published or offered for sale."'85 In contrast, a phonorecord need
not contain a copyright notice.'86 In this context, the difference between
179. Section 24 provides that the "copyright secured by this title shall endure for twenty-eight
years from the date of first publication." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
180. Note that this concession is not made in the case of a work that is shared with the world
exclusively by public performances, regardless of the number of showings. See supra notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
181. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331
(1995).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed effective 1978).
183. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
184. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 817 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed effective 1978) (emphasis added).
186. Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 198 (2d
Cir. 1965). See also Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The
failure to affix notice to the phonorecord... did not affect any statutory or common law copyright
protection otherwise applicable to the underlying work.").
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phonorecords and copies is clear. Although Congress has never expressly
stated that phonorecords are copies in any context, the Ninth Circuit has
held that they are copies in the context of publication under the 1909
Act.'87 Given the severe consequences to artists who have relied on the
opposite interpretation, the Ninth Circuit's rule is indefensible in the
absence of clear congressional support.
V. CONCLUSION
Many songs were distributed on phonorecords before January 1, 1978,
when the 1909 Act was in effect, without the author affirmatively
seeking statutory protection. The understanding of the music industry
and the copyright bar was that the consequences of "publication" on
common-law rights were not applicable to the distribution of
phonorecords. This interpretation was settled as judicial precedent in the
Second Circuit, and artists relied on its logic. This rule of law went
unchallenged by other circuits until 1995. Although the issue turns on the
interpretation of the 1909 Act, substantial property interests are at stake.
The Ninth Circuit rule in ZZ Top provides that all compositions
released on phonorecords before 1978 without notice of copyright are
now in the public domain. While the Ninth Circuit approves of
unauthorized copying, the copier would be subject to liability for
infringement in the Second Circuit. The diametrically opposed positions
between the two circuits that hear the greatest number of music copyright
cases must be reconciled.
A sounder rule is that a phonorecord cannot publish the musical
composition because it is not a copy thereof. This interpretation of the
1909 Act reflects the intent of Congress, serves the policy of rewarding
creative effort, and is consistent with music industry practice. Moreover,
the commencement of the statutory term at the time of phonorecord
distribution protects the public interest embodied in the "limited times"
clause of the Constitution, yet still favors original creation over pirating
and copying.
187. ZZ Top, 44 F.3d at 815.
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